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THE ANTIDUMPING ACT - TARIFF OR ANTITRUST LAW?
IF a French manufacturer of corsets sells his product in France for ten
dollars and in the United States for seven dollars fifty cents, he is engaged
in "dumping" - price discrimination between national markets' - and may
be subject to the provisions of the Antidumping Act of 1921.2 This act pro-
vides that the Secretary of the Treasury, after conducting an investigation,
shall determine whether sales at "less than fair value" have been made in
the United States.3 For purposes of this investigation, "fair value" is ordi-
narily defined as the existing market price of the commodity in the country
of manufacture.4 If the Treasury makes such a finding, it then sends the case
to the Tariff Commission for a determination whether, as a result of such
sales at less than fair value, an American industry "is being, or is likely to be,
injured or is prevented from being established."5 If an affirmative finding
is made, the Treasury is required to direct the Custom Appraiser to impose
a "special dumping duty" equivalent to the difference between the importer's
purchase price and the foreign market price.8 The duty is then applied against
1. VINER, DUrPING: A PRoBLEm iN ITE ATIo A. TRADE 3 (1923) (hereinafter
cited as V=R). For a discussion of less precise uses of the term "dumping" which should
be distinguished, see id. at 1-3.
2. 42 Stat. 11 (1921), as amended, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-73 (1958).
3. 42 Stat. 11 (1921), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 160 (a) (1958). Details of the Treasury
investigation procedure are found in 19 C.F.R. § 14.6 (1964), as amended, 29 Fed. Reg.
16321 (1964).
4. 19 C.F.R. § 14.7(a) (1) (1964). In some cases, e.g., where all of the particular
item produced in a country is exported, it is not possible to use the foreign market price
standard. The Secretary then uses as the "fair vaue" standard either the average price
quoted to third countries, or the "cost of production." 19 C.F.R. §§ 14.7(a) (2), (3) (1964).
Once the "fair value!' of an item is established, the Secretary takes the price paid by
the importer and deducts shipping costs, tariffs, packaging costs, and similar marketing
charges to arrive at a constructed f.o.b. factory "purchase price." If the purchase price
is less than the "fair value," dumping is said to exist The mechanics of the comparison,
which are quite technical, are described in 19 C.F.R. § 14.7(b) (1964), as amended, 29
Fed. Reg. 5474 (1964). For an intelligible explanation of the process, see Hearings on
HR. 6006 before House Ways and Means Comm., 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-40 (1957)
(Remarks of Asst. Secy of the Treasury David IV. Kendal) (hereinafter cited as 1957
House Hearings).
5. 42 Stat. 11 (1921), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958). The original act
gave the Secretary of the Treasury the responsibility of determining whether injury ex-
isted. This task was transferred to the Tariff Commission in 1954. 68 Stat. 1138 (1954).
6. 42 Stat. 11 (1921), as amended, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160(a), 161, 168 (1958). See also
19 C.F.R. § 1622 (1964). In cases in which the transaction between the exporter and
importer is not made at arms-length it may be possible to "doctor" the figures to avoid
a finding of dumping under the "purchase price" standard. Therefore, when the exporter
and importer are related in one of the ways described by the Act [19 U.S.C. § 166 (1958)]
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all less than fair value goods from the dumping country of the "same class
or kind" as the original dumped goods. It is apparent from this summary
of the major provisions of the Antidumping Act that the act represents a
significant deterrent to the continued importation of suspect merchandise,
particularly in those cases where the non-dumping or fair value price is not
competitive in the American market.7 For many years the obscurity of the
act insulated it from criticism, but the recent and growing emphasis on the
elimination of barriers to international trade has forced it into a position of
heated controversy.
The act itself is a curious hybrid of traditional tariff ideas and price dis-
crimination theories of antitrust law, and one of the fundamental difficulties
a different formula is applied. This is the "exporter's sales price" defined in 19 U.S.C.
§ 163 (1958).
It should also be noted that in calculating the dumping duty the Appraiser looks
only to the foreign market value on the date of purchase. In calculating "fair value"
the Secretary of the Treasury looks to the average foreign market value over the relevant
period of time. 19 C.F.R. §§ 14.7(a) (1), (b) (7) (1964). Since the foreign market value
is recalculited for each subsequent shipment, one would conclude that the purpose of
the original investigation by the Secretary of the Treasury is to provide an opportunity
for all interested parties to be heard before the duty is imposed.
If the parties fail to take advantage of this opportunity to be heard, it is at their own
peril. The act provides for judicial review of findings only after a duty has been levied,
42 Stat. 15 (1921), 19 U.S.C. § 169 (1958). This means that the only remedy available
to a dissatisfied party is to appeal the action of the Customs Appraiser to the Customs
Court under the provisions for challenging a customs classification or appraisal, 19
U.S.C. § 1516(b) (1958). Attempts to review the determination of the Treasury or Tariff
Commission leading to a dumping finding have without exception met with failure. One
case has suggested that the jurisdiction of the Customs Court extends to decisions prior
to the action of the Appraiser. Horton v. Humphrey, 146 F. Supp. 819, 821 (D.D.C,),
aff'd. per curiam, 352 U.S. 921 (1956). However, the majority of the decisions attempting
to review the merits of preliminary determinations have followed the line that the courts
can consider only gross procedural irregularities. See, e.g., Kleberg & Co. v, United
States, 71 F.2d 332 (Cust. Ct. 1933) (Treasury finding); United States v. Elof Hansson,
Inc., 48 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 91 (1960) (Treasury finding); Ellis IK Orlowitz Co. v.
United States, 200 F. Supp. 302 (Cust. Ct. 1961) (Tariff Comm'n finding).
7. Importers are particularly concerned with the amount of time required for Treasury
investigations. 109 CoNG. Rac. 6444 (1963) (Remarks of Senator Humphrey); see gen-
erally Hearings on HR. 11970 before Senate Finance Committee, 87th Cong., 2d Sess,.
pt. 3, 1532-50 (1962).
The problem of delay is particularly burdensome because of the provisions authorizing
the Secretary to withhold appraisal on suspected goods while an investigation is in progress,
19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1958); 19 C.F.R. §§ 14.9, 14.10 (1964), as amended, 29 Fed, Reg.
16322 (1964). If appraisal is withheld, an importer may not have his goods processed by
customs without posting a bond sufficient to cover both the ordinary duty and any special
dumping duty that might be applied. Because he cannot know whether the dumping duty
will apply or how large it may be, the importer cannot calculate his costs and will be




in interpreting it has been the problem of determining its primary thrust.8 The
act's requirement that the importation of dumped goods have the effect of
injuring American industry is reminiscent of the typical protective tariff de-
signed to shield American industry from the competition of foreign goods
produced under competitive advantages such as cheap lbor and raw materials.0
On the other hand, unlike a tariff, the Antidumping Act does not penalize
all imports injurious to American industry, but only those sold at discrimina-
tory prices. While in theory an industry can be driven to the wall by low
priced imports, the act can be invoked only if the foreigner is selling at a price
lower than that prevailing in his home market. This latter characteristic sug-
gests that the principal evil of dumping is its discriminatory nature as opposed
to its injurious effect, and it is primarily within the context of the antitrust law
that the expression of a policy against price discrimination is found. 0 Yet,
since the injury requisite for the invocation of the act need only be to American
industry, the usual antitrust problem of determining injury to competition in
the relevant market may never be reached. Finally, the remedy provided against
dumping is unquestionably in the form of a duty imposed upon goods along
with the ordinary tariff levies at the point of importation. The remedy is ad-
ministered by authorities charged with supervising the tariff including the
Customs Bureau, the Treasury, and the Tariff Commission. But while the
act prescribes the application of a duty, this duty is of a very curious sort. It
is applied specifically rather than generally. In dumping cases, unlike ordinary
tariff situations, a separate finding must be made by both the Treasury and
the Tariff Commission with regard to each product and each country involved."
Thus, while the duty resembles a tariff in form, on a functional level it more
closely resembles a sanction intended to punish or deter a particular undesirable
act, such as violation of an antitrust law.
This unclear union of disparate elements drawn from tariff and antitrust
law has resulted in a marked ambivalence in the Tariff Commission's interpre-
tation of the act's injury clause. In its earlier determinations, the Commission
8. Ehrenhaft, Protection Against Interatlional Price Discrimination: United Stales
Countervailing and Antidumping Duties, 58 Cor.m. L Rav. 44, 48 (1958).
9. See, e.g., 46 Stat. 701 (1930), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1336 (1958); 46 Stat. 6S9
(1930); 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1958).
10. See, e.g., 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (Clayton Act), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1958)
(Robinson-Patman Act). The legislative history of this price discrimination statute is
summarized in RowvE, PRIcE DISCREMNATIN UNDER THE ROBNS0oN-PATIAr " Acr 3-11
(1962).
11. The act itself does not explicitly provide for the consideration of goods separately
according to country of origin but provides only for a finding with respect to a class or
kind of foreign merchandise, 42 Stat. 11, 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958). While a country
by country determination is necessary for the purposes of determining "foreign market
value" [19 U.S.C. § 161 (1958)], it is not always necessary to consider imports of identical
goods from different countries separately for purposes of determining '"injury." An amend-
ment to the act, S. 1318, 88th Cong, 1st Sess. § 10 (1963), which would require the Treas-
ury to consolidate all complaints concerned with the same class of goods before they
are sent to the Tariff Commission, has been introduced.
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seemed to seek guidance in the standard of injury set out in the "escape
clause" section of the conventional tariff laws which the Commission had ad'
ministered since its enactment.12 As applied in the tariff context, this standard
looked principally to the effect of importation upon American businesses, and
a finding of injury was made when, among other things, domestic firms had
suffered a loss of customers or sales, or had been forced to reduce prices or
output. Utilization of this tariff standard has led to findings of injury in
virtually all of the dumping cases in which the domestic industry both lost
sales and was forced to lower prices.18 However, in dumping cases where
both of these factors have not been evident, the Commission has failed to
achieve consistent results. For example, in the European Steel Wire Rods
cases' -' the domestic industry had lost a sizeable amount of business but had
maintained the existing level of prices despite the presence of dumped goods
at lower prices. Under the escape clause standard this situation would clearly
amount to injury, but the Commission avoided this result by holding that the
loss of sales was caused not by the dumped goods, but by other factors.16 The
parallel situation, in which the domestic firms reduced prices to a competitive
level and so managed to avoid any loss of sales, has also resulted in a no injury
finding.16 The implication of these cases is that the Commission has used the
12. 65 Stat. 73, 74 (1951), as amended, 67 Stat. 472 (1953), 69 Stat. 165-66 (1955),
72 Stat. 676 (1958) [Formerly codified as 19 U.S.C. §§ 1363, 1364; repealed 76 Stat. 882
(1962)]. Cf. Bronz, The Tariff Commission as a Regulatory Agency, 61 COLUm. L. REv,
463, 468-77 (1961). See note 42, infra.
13. See, e.g., Chromic Acid from Australia, 29 Fed. Reg. 2919 (1964); Portland
Grey Cement from Portugal, 26 Fed. Reg. 10010 (1961); Portland Cement from Belgium,
26 Fed. Reg. 5102 (1961) ; Bicycles from Czechoslovakia, 25 Fed. Reg. 9782 (1960) ; Cast
Iron Soil Pipe from the United Kingdom, Treas. Dept. Press Release, Oct. 27, 1955.
14. Steel Wire Rods from Belgium, 28 Fed. Reg. 6474 (1963); Steel Wire Rods
from Luxembourg, 28 Fed. Reg. 6476 (1963); Steel Wire Rods from West Germany, 28
Fed. Reg. 6606 (1963); Steel Wire Rods from France, 28 Fed. Reg. 7368 (1963). The
reasoning in these four cases is almost identical and they are hereinafter referred to as
Steel Wire Rods cases.
15. Steel rods from Japan were selling in the United States at prices substantially
below those charged by the domestic firms. The Treasury had previously found that the
Japanese rods were not sold at less than fair value (LTFV). The Commission found the
Japanese rods to be the "significant factor" in creating the disturbance to the domestic
industry and held that no injury was caused by the European sales at LTFV. The cases
thus can be read as allowing a dumper to raise as a defense the argument that he is only
meeting the competition of a third country selling in the U.S. market. This interpretation
is supported by Steel Reinforcing Bars from Canada, 29 Fed. Reg. 3840 (1964), in which
the Commission found injury as a result of Canadian imports at LTFV, but noted that
in the affected area there was no third country acting as a "price leader" for the importer
to meet.
16. See, e.g., Rayon Staple Fiber from West Germany, 26 Fed. Reg. 6537 (1961);
Tissue Paper from Norway, 23 Fed. Reg. 8892 (1958). For a summary of the application
of injury standards, see Coudert, The Application of the United States Aildumping Law
in the Light of a Liberal Trade Policy, 65 COLUm. L. REv. 189, 204-16 (1965).
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indicia of injury to an industry spelled out in the escape clause, but has oc-
casionally found the result of this strict tariff standard undesirable.n7
Although these cases may have implied an awareness on the part of the
Commission that dumping injurious to competitors may not always be harm-
ful to competitive conditions in the American market, the first explicit refer-
ence to an anticompetitive effect test - a doctrine designed to protect compe-
tition rather than competitors - came in the case of Titanium Dioxide from
France,' where the Commission stated:
It is evident that Congress did not consider sales "at less than fair
value" as being malur per se; such sales are condemned in the act only
when they have anticompetitive effect; and it is only then that such sales
may be equated with the concept of "unfair competition." 10
Howeve, in finding no injury, both the tariff and anticompetitive effect ap-
proaches were mentioned: "This competition, however, is neither anti-com-
petitive in nature nor has it attained a level of significance that connotes
material injury for the domestic injury."20 In the more recent case of Chromic
Acid from Australia s the Commission not only mentioned, but explicitly
relied on what it considered an anticompetitive effect to find injury. Dumped
imports were increasing rapidly and had appropriated 1.47 of the national
market and 14% of the West Coast market. The industry was particularly
cost sensitive, and although the domestic producers had cut prices, they were
still undersold by a significant margin. A price war had begun which con-
17. In such cases the Commission may look for an "escape hatch" to avoid the injury
finding which a tariff standard might suggest. The use of the "causation" or "meeting
competition" argument in the Steel Wire Rods cases may reflect this sort of approach.
See note 15 supra. Dumping decisions have become increasingly subject to outside in-
fluence of a political nature. Thus the Steel Wire Rods cases were regarded as "a show-
down of enormous proportions... a major test of the antidumping route to protection
against imports!' N.Y. Times, April 15, 1963, § C, p. 45, col 8. Cf. 109 CONG. REc. 8244-46.
Following their defeat in Steel Wire Rods the steel companies mounted a "massive assault
on imported steel," including efforts to obtain a revision of Treasury Department regula-
tions which would "make it easier to obtain a dumping conviction." Wall Street Journal,
Feb. 10, 1964, p. 26, cols. 1-3; N.Y. Times, February 17, 1964, p. 41, col. 2. Some of the
industry's objectives were granted in the revisions promulgated by the Treasury. 29 Fed.
Reg. 16320-22 (1964). See Coudert, supra note 16, at 194-202.
On the other hand it was argued that an injury finding in Steel Wire Rods w,.ould
move European nations to invoke antidumping laws against the United States and "would
seriously weaken the bargaining position of the United States in the forthcoming Kennedy
round of tariff negotiations." 109 CONG. REc. 9536 (1963). An official of the State Depart-
ment is charged with following the progress of antidumping investigations. In an interview
with the author in December, 1963, this official indicated that in cases which the State
Department feels may have an important impact on foreign trade policy the Department's
views are often made known to the Treasury "unofficially," but at the undersecretary
leveL Compare 1957 House Hearings at 67-68, 80.
18. 28 Fed. Reg. 10467 (1963).
19. Ibid.
20. Id. at I0468.
21. 29 Fed. Reg. 2919 (1964).
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tinued to the time of the investigation. The Commission, citing with approval
the Titanium Dioxide case, concluded that the disruption and depression of
prices and the rapid penetration of the regional market with the capture of
a major share by the importer had an anticompetitive effect upon "a major
United States market." It thus appeared after Chromic Acid that the Com-
mission had begun to articulate a test of injury looking to the effect of dumping
on competition. Although the Commission did not formulate standards de-
limiting this test,2 3 the concept exists in the case law as a possible alternative
to the tariff approach.
Having made this tentative attempt to develop a new framework for the
analysis of injury, the Commission suddenly and surprisingly abandoned the
effort and reverted to a tariff approach. In the recent Carbon Steel Bars and
Shapes from Canada 24 decision the Commission found injury to an industry
composed of only three steel companies located in Washington and Oregon.
Two types of injury were found: first, the imports operated to "deprive the
domestic concerns of a significant volume of sales ;" second, the domestic firms
were unable to take part in a national price rise which went into effect in the
steel industry while the dumping continued. There was no mention of whether
the Canadian dumping was anticompetitive in effect save for the observation
that ". . . the [Canadian] manufacturer priced his goods to the importer far
below the level that was necessary to make his products reasonably price
competitive. '25 While this language seemingly indicates only that the Canadian
producer was competing somewhat too vigorously, it is consistent with the
fundamental principle of a tariff approach - protection of American com-
petitors regardless of the cost in higher prices or reduced availability of goods
to the American consumer.
Today, American legal and economic theory surrounding the area of eco-
nomic regulation of business enterprises is largely premised upon a commit-
22. The dumping company's share of the West Coast market had risen to 30/o In
the last 3 months of the period of dumping. Ibid.
23. The Commission did find that
When chromic acid purchased from Australia at less than fair value hs sold In
the United States at a price significantly lower than all domestic manufacturero'
wholesale prices of the like product in the United States, thereby greatly disrupting
and depressing prices in a major United States market for such product, and where
the evidence indicates that as a result of such underselling there is a rapid pene-
tration of a major market area with a subsequent capture of a major "share" of
that market by the importer .. such sales of the imported product are anti-com-
petitive.
29 Fed. Reg. at 2920 (1964). One must suppose, however, that the factors noted as In-
jurious were not intended by the Commission as defining "anti-competitive effect," first,
because this statement is prefaced by a reference to the facts of the particular case, and
second, because such a standard was implicitly abandoned in the Canadian Steel Bars anld
Shapes case. 29 Fed. Reg. 12599 (1964).
24. Ibid.
25. Id. at 12600.
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ment to a competitive system which is presumed to allocate resources most
efficiently and to result in the distribution of goods to the consumer at the
lowest possible price.2 6 A tariff approach which focuses exclusive emphasis
on injury to American firms runs counter to this firmly established policy of
promoting competition and enhancing consumer satisfaction.T If a tariff stand-
ard is applied in dumping cases, the Commission is likely to overlook the fact
that dumping may result in positive and significant advantages to consumers
and to society in general, outweighing the loss of sales or profits to some firms.
The most obvious example is the case in which the product market is domi-
nated by a domestic monopoly. In such a case the entry of dumped goods in
appreciable quantity might force the monopolist to lower his price to a com-
petitive level, or might weaken his position thereby reducing barriers to com-
peting American firms. Although in either case the result would be lower
prices and increased quality competition, the injury to the monopoly firm
would almost certainly be sufficient under a tariff standard to invoke the
Antidumping Act, thus cutting off these beneficial results at the outset. A
second and perhaps more realistic situation is likely to arise when the dumped
product is a raw material or semifinished product. Here the availability of
materials at low prices may enable smaller firms producing finished products
to compete more strenuously with large and integrated firms controlling the
domestic source of supply.28 Again, permitting such dumping is likely to
lower prices to all consumers. In contrast to a tariff approach, a test based
on anticompetitive effect would ask whether the dumping in question con-
stituted a threat to the continuation of viable competition in the relevant
market. It would assume that wherever possible the domestic firm should
be required to meet lower prices by increasing productive efficiency rather
than be permitted to stifle price competition by invoking the Antidumping Act.^
Not only does an economic theory of encouraging competition militate against
a tariff approach, but the weight of the act's legislative history seems to in-
dicate that such an approach was not intended. There are, of course, aspects
26. See, e.g., AT'Y GEN. NAT'L Com AxTRusT RiP. 2, 337-38; SA2MUELSoN, Eco-
NomIcs 555-56 (1961 ed.); cf.. MASON, EcONOMIc CoxcEnTRATIoN AM THE MoiOPOLY
PROBLEm 178-79 (1951).
27. ExxE & SA.ERa, INTE RATIONAL ECONOMiCS 399-403 (1961 ed.); See generally
SAmuELsoN, op cit. supra note 24, at ch. 33.
28. VuaR 134-35; U.S. TARniE Comi', 1919 REPORT orN DUrnmG AND UNFAM
FOREIGN COrmTrnION IN THE UluTED STATES, reprinted in EBB, INTERNATIoNAL Busnnss
836-38 (1964).
29. Viner's analysis supports the anticompetitive effect test suggested. The only type
of dumping which he thought the act might legitimately penalize was "intermittent"
dumping - programs of limited duration undertaken systematically and with a "predatory"
motive such as the desire to eliminate competition or forestall its development in the
dumped market. The significant danger in these cases was the adverse effect upon compe-
tition which might in the extreme leave the dumper in control and free to raise prices.
The factor distinguishing such undesirable dumping was the presence of temporary
cheapness due to predatory motivation. Vnum 25-27.
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of the history of dumping legislation which support the contention that Con-
gress sought to enact a tariff standard of injury. The present act is historically
- although only coincidentally - associated with tariff legislation. It was
originally part of the Emergency Tariff Act of 1921,80 and was amended by
a "hotchpot" tariff act in 1954.31 The 1954 amendments lend strength to the
tariff argument because they transferred the administration of the injury de-
termination to the Tariff Commission. And, as already noted, the statutory
language focuses attention on injury to domestic industry and does not make
explicit mention of the effect of dumping upon competitive conditions.0 2 As
usual, however, the legislative history does not point exclusively in one di-
rection. Indeed, the more persuasive evidence seems to indicate a preference
for an anticompetitive effect test modeled on early antitrust legislation. An
earlier version of the Antidumping Act enacted in 1916 required a finding of
specific intent to restrain commerce.83 The language of that requirement is
strikingly similar to that introduced by the Clayton Act just two years previ-
ously,84 and the remedies provided by the 1916 Act - criminal sanctions and
private treble damage suits-are also found in the Clayton Act.85 Although these
features were abandoned ii the 1921 Act and replaced by a duty as a means
of curbing dumping, this change was in all likelihood merely designed to avoid
the practical difficulties of securing jurisdiction over foreign producers and of
proving predatory intent under the earlier act.80 The history of the period,
legislative and otherwise, shows that Congress felt the existing act would
prove inadequate to halt an expected massive dumping campaign by European
cartels designed to destroy a number of fledgling American industries and
to monopolize American markets87 In sum, the evidence indicates that the
changes of the 1921 Act did not reflect a shift from the antitrust philosophy
of the earlier legislation to an outright tariff approach.8 Nor should the 1954
amendments be taken as evidence of a changed congressional attitude. The
30. 42 Stat. 9, 11 (1921). The Antidumping Act comprised Title II of this statute.
31. Customs Simplification Act of 1954 (Title III), 68 Stat. 1138 (1954).
32. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
33. 39 Stat 798 (1916), 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1958).
34. Section 2 of the Clayton Act prohibits domestic price discrimination when 1t3
effect "may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce." Other sections contain similar language. Compare Clayton Act §§ 2,
3, & 7, 38 Stat 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14, & 18 (1958), with 15 U.S.C.
§ 72. Cf. VINER 244; Hearings on HR. 6006 before Senate Finance Committee, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 73-76 (1958).
35. 38 Stat. 73 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
36. VINER 244-45. Viner also notes that "the American system of administration of
the ordinary import duties facilitates the operation of an antidumping law such as the
[1921 Act]." Id. at 265.
37. See 1957 House Hearings at 96, 122, 362; Ehrenhaft, supra note 8, at 53 n.56. See
generally H. REP. No. 479, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., (1920).
38. See U.S. TAmFv Comh.'Nx, op. cit. supra note 28, at 839; Hearings on HR. 6006,
supra note 34, at 75.
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legislative history of those changes indicates that no real consideration or
evaluation of the policy and philosophy of dumping regulation was under-
taken.39 The transfer of administrative duties to the Commission was made
largely because the Treasury had found that it lacked an adequate staff for
gathering the information necessary to make a determination of injury.40 Be-
cause the language of existing tariff law was superficially similar to that of
the Antidumping Act, and because the Tariff Commission possessed a trained
staff and some backlog of experience in interpreting the tariff provisions, it
seemed reasonable to transfer to it the administration of the Antidumping Act.
Even if the legislative history of the 1921 Antidumping Act and its amend-
ments supported an outright tariff approach, such an interpretation of the
present act would run counter to the policy recently and energetically expressed
in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.4- Among the significant changes brought
into the tariff law by that act was a new approach to the escape clause. This
clause originally provided a procedure whereby a domestic producer injured
by a tariff reduction granted by the President under the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act could seek restoration of tariff protection.43 In 1962 the
language of the old clause was substantially altered with the effect of making
it more difficult for a domestic industry to establish injury in order to secure
relief." At the same time the Trade Expansion Act instituted entirely new
39. Hearings on HR. 9476 before House Ways & Means Comm, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
43, 101 (1954) (hereinafter cited as 1954 House Hearings). During these hearings sug-
gestions were made for changes in the injury requirement, id. at 35-38, 93, 102, 136-37, 139,
but no action was taken by Congress. Extensive hearings in 1957 yielded the same result.
The Ways and Means Committee concluded that a "re-evaluation of the basic policy issues
involved in antidumping legislation!' would be "premature." HR. Rozp. No. 1261, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1957).
40. 1954 House Hearings at 14, 140.
41. Id. at 39-41.
42. 76 Stat. 872 (1962), 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (Supp. IV 1963).
43. 65 Stat 73-74 (1951), as amended, 67 Stat 472 (1953), 69 Stat. 165-66 (1955),
72 Stat. 676 (1958).
44. See Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Title III, § 301(b) (c) ; 76 Stat. 883 (1Q62),
19 U.S.C. § 1901(b) (Supp. IV 1963). The language of the new "escape clause" should
be compared with the old. Previously an industry might obtain relief if it could show
any of the following:
a downward trend of production, employment prices, profits, or wages . . . or a
decline in sales, an increase in imports, either actual or relative to domestic pro-
duction, a higher or growing inventory, or a decline in the proportion of the domestic
market supplied by domestic producers. Increased imports, either actual or relative,
shall be considered as the cause or threat of serious injury to the domestic industry
producing like or directly competitive products when the [Tariff] Commission finds
that such increased imports have contributed substantially towards causing or threat-
ening serious injury to such industry.
65 Stat. 74 (1951), as amended, 69 Stat. 166 (1955). Under the new "escape clause" the
principal factors noted by Congress as "injurious" are the "idling of productive fadllties
inability to operate at a reasonable level of profit, and underemployment." Further, under
the present law, "imports shall be considered to cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury
19651
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provisions providing for "adjustment assistance," primarily in the form of
government subsidies, for industries unable to qualify for escape clause relief.46
These later provisions evidence a new philosophy in tariff legislation. For the
first time Congress recognized that reciprocal tariff reduction and the ensuing
international competition will inevitably produce injury to some producers;
but Congress decided that the provision of limited- relief to these industries
was preferable to raising tariffs and thus depriving all consumers of the benefits
of increased trade and lower prices.46 If the injury requirement in the Anti-
dumping Act were read as incorporating the tariff standard of the pre-1962
escape clause, the result would be inconsistent with the goals of the Trade
Expansion Act; by bringing a complaint under the Antidumping Act, an in-
dustry might ultimately secure some tariff relief unavailable under the new
escape clause.
This potential loophole in the Trade Expansion Act might be avoided by
construing the Antidumping Act in pari materia with the Trade Expansion
Act. The Commission might thus choose to develop a less protective tariff
standard by reading the 1962 definition of injury into the Antidumping Act.41
This reinterpretation, however, would still ignore the economic theory and
legislative history militating in favor of the adoption of an anticompetitive
effect test. Alternatively, the Commission might give recognition to these
factors and take a more creative stance looking to the basic philosophy of the
Trade Expansion Act - the desire for increased foreign competition in Ameri-
can markets. 48 Under the latter approach, it could be argued that the 1962
escape clause represented the exclusive tariff protection desired for American
industry and that to achieve the congressional goal of free trade and full
competition, the Antidumping Act should be redirected toward its original
purpose of protection of competition in the American market. The Commission
to the domestic industry concerned when ... such increased imports have been the niajor
factor in causing or threatening to cause such injury." 76 Stat. 884 (1962), 19 U.S.C. §
1901(b) (2), (3) (Supp. IV, 1963) (emphasis added). For an analysis of the changes In
coverage and philosophy wrought by the new law see Coudert, .sipra note 16, at 218-19.
Surrey, Legal Problems to be Encountered hn the Operation of the Trade E.vpansion Ael
of 1962, 41 No. CAP. L. R v. 389, 393-94 (1963); 1962 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. Ncus 3143
(Remarks of Sen. Curtis).
45. 76 Stat. 883 (1962); 19 U.S.C. §§ 1901-91 (Supp. IV 1963).
46. See Surrey, supra note 44, at 394.
47. The Commission could read the phrase "all economic factors which it considers
relevant!' in the 1962 escape clause to mean those factors indicating injury to competition,
It is unlikely, however, that these indicia could always be used consistently with those
explicitly stated in the antidumping statute.
48. The purpose of the act as stated in the preamble is:
(1.) to stimulate the economic growth of the United States and maintain and
enlarge foreign markets for the products of United States agriculture, industry,
mining, and commerce;
(2.) to strengthen economic relations with foreign countries through the develop-
ment of open and nondiscriminatory trading in the free world ....
76 Stat 872, 19 U.S.C. § 1801 (Supp. IV 1963).
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might then attempt to amplify its embryonic anticompetitive effect test and
to formulate standards defining injury to competition.
Although economic considerations, the legislative history of the Antidumping
Act, and the philosophy of the Trade Expansion Act support the adoption of
an anticompetitive effect test, the consistent application of such a test would
seem impossible: there is specific language in the Antidumping Act which
may require a tariff approach. Although the conduct singled out for regulation
by the act is price discrimination, the statutory finding necessary for invocation
of the act is injury to a domestic industry.4 9 This injury, of course, is not
synonomous with injury to competition in the American market. It is possible
to envision an industry so dispersed among world producers that domestic
production represents only a small percentage of total American sales. Even
if the American industry were materially injured or completely destroyed by
dumping, the effect on competition in the American market would be negligible.
Viable competition from various world sources would persist and the interests
of consumers would not be significantly affected, but it might, nevertheless, be
necessary to apply the act because of the occurrence of injury to an American
industry. It thus appears that at least some legislative revision would be re-
quired in order to achieve the goal of free competition in the American market
while still maintaining safeguards against monopolization. The most obvious
form such revision could take would be an amendment to the current act
adopting an anticompetitive effect test requiring substantial injury to competi-
tion in the relevant American market in place of the present standard of in-
jury to a domestic industry.
The adoption of this amendment would, however, confront Congress and
the Commission with the further problem of formulating relevant indicia of
injury to competition. A ready source of standards would be the price dis-
crimination provisions of the Clayton Act which, if not direct predecessors
to the Antidumping Act, are at least collaterally related." But uncritical re-
liance on recent doctrines developed under the Clayton Act as amended by
the Robinson-Patman Act 51 would be less than helpful. For the courts have
in a number of situations interpreted the "substantially lessen competition"
language of the Robinson-Patman Act in a manner which has in effect paid
little attention to the preservation of competition and has served only to pro-
tect certain competitors.52 Although the original prohibitions of Clayton section
2 were designed to prevent predatory price discrimination by large sellers
intent upon monopolizing markets by destroying weaker competitors s the
Robinson-Patman amendments of 1936 significantly altered this emphasis by
49. See note 5 supra and accompanying text
50. See note 34 supra and accompanying text
51. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1958).
52. See, e.g., S.AumrsoN, Ecoxoincs 560 (1961 ed.). Compare Rows, op. cit. mspra
note 10, at 126-32; EDwARDs, THE PaicE DiscitmnNAToN LAw 518-31 (1959).
53. See NE=L, TE A nmusr LAws OF THE UNMn STAEs 216 (1960).
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shifting the focus from monopolization to injury to small business.51 Thus
the Supreme Court could conclude in 1948 that the amended section 2 was
"intended to justify a finding of injury to competition by a showing of injury
to the competitor victimized by the discrimination."55 While there is consider-
able debate as to the finality and desirability of such an interpretation of the
Robinson-Patman Act, protection of competitors seems inappropriate under
the Antidumping Act. For such protection, imposed without regard to the
benefits derived by consumers from competition, is no more than the tariff
approach clothed in new language. Since this approach was rejected above
as being both economically undesirable and incompatible with the aims of
the Trade Expansion Act, application of existing Clayton Act standards in
the dumping context would be self-defeating.
It is possible that an alternative definition of anticompetitive effect more
apropriate to the regulation of dumping can be derived from the famous
Standard Oil case of 1911.rG Among the predatory practices alleged in that
case was the sale of oil products at low prices in limited geographical areas
in order to drive out small competitors - in effect price discrimination.T The
notable reaction of the Supreme Court to this and other "unnatural" practices
was not a flat prohibition, but the broad "rule of reason."58 In its most funda-
mental formulation, this rule directs courts first to examine the nature or
character of the particular practice to determine whether it is inherently anti-
competitive. 0 If the result of this inquiry is inconclusive, the court then looks
to the surrounding circumstances to judge whether the practice has the primary
"purpose and effect" of eliminating competition and producing the evils of
monopoly.60
When this general analysis is applied to the determination of injury in
dumping cases, it is immediately apparent that the sale of goods at a low
price in this country is not by nature anticompetitive. Dumping may in some
cases actually enhance domestic competition as, for example, when the Ameri-
can price is artificially high.01 Moreover, the fact that a dumping price is lower
than the home market price indicates nothing about the harmful nature of
54. Id. at 217-18. F.T.C. v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 49 (1948). For a summary
of the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman amendment see RowE, op. cit. supra note
10, at 11-25.
55. F.T.C. v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. at 49 (1948). It is interesting to compare
this reasoning with the interpretation given to Section 7 of the Clayton Act in Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) : "It is competition, not competitors, which the
Act protects. But we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition
through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses." Id. at 344.
56. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
57. Id. at 43.
58. Id. at 60, 61.
59. Id. at 58. See ATr'y GEN. NAT'L ComM. ANTITRUST REx'. 7-12.
60. 221 U.S. at 58. See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179
(1911).
61. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
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dumping. If the dumper also lowered his domestic price to equal the American
price, the effect on the American market would be the same but the Antidump-
ing Act would be wholly inapplicable. 62 It is clear, then, that it is necessary
to consider the purpose and effect of a particular dumping scheme to decide
whether sanctions should be applied.
The Court in Standard Oil in determining the purpose and effect of price
discrimination did not look primarily to the damage to the individual com-
petitors of Standard Oil. Rather, it looked to see whether the practice had
resulted in any of the evils associated with monopoly. The percentage of the
market controlled by Standard Oil and its power over price and output were
at the heart of the Court's finding that Standard Oil's behavior was anticom-
petitive.63 If the Court looked to the effect of price discrimination upon com-
petitors, it did so only indirectly. It held that the use of such "unnatural"
practices viewed in connection with "effect" in terms of domination of the
market supported an inference of intent to restrain competition." While it is
doubtful that the Court would have made this inference in the absence of any
showing of market domination, the Court's treatment of the allegedly dis-
criminatory practices has given rise to the so-called "predation" theory which
has continued in the antitrust law since that time. But as some commentators
have pointed out, this theory is of limited utility.0 5 The mere fact that a pro-
ducer can sell at a dumping or discriminatory price does not necessarily support
an inference of predatory intent to monopolize. 0 For example, if the dumper
is engaged in an industry which yields economies of scale, he may find it profit-
able to increase production and dispose of the increase in a new market at
the best price it will command. 7
62. The fact that a foreign producer may be able to dump because he enjoys a monopoly
position in his home market is irrelevant as regards the nature of the offense. Ehrenhaft
has made the suggestion, based in turn on a suggestion by Viner, that a foreign monopoly
is necessary only to sustain predatory dumping, that is selling below marginal cost with
the intention of later raising prices. "Continuous" dumping (Vmxn 23-25, 30), on the
other hand, need only require that a dumper encounter inelastic demand in his home
market such that he can not dispose of the excess production resulting from economies
of scale at home without depressing his domestic price. In such circumstances he can
realize an extra profit by dumping his excess at prices below his average but above his
marginal cost. See Ehrenhaft, supra note 8, at 49-50 and nn.19, 21, 27, 30.
63. 221 U.S. 1, 75 (1911).
64. Id. at 75-77.
65. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (NJ.) Case, 1 J. L. & Ecoir.
137 (1958) ; Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, Fortune, Dec. 1963, p. 138.
66. One can infer that the seller has a "deep pocket" - a source of funds which
renders him willing and able to accept a losing price in one market in order to secure
a competitive advantage. But, without further information, it is equally reasonable to
conclude that the seller is only pursuing sound business practice in order to maximize
his return. See note 62 -suPra.
67. It is assumed in this case that the home market is "saturated" - the seller cannot
dispose of more there without reducing his price significantly, and further that the two
markets are national and somewhat insulated by shipping charges or ordinary tariff bar-
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It may be that, absent actual domination of the American market, intent
to monopolize is the only indicator by which we can distinguish anticompetitive
or predatory dumping, which is likely to result in artificially high prices, from
dumping which merely offers the American consumer a bargain. But the
only way in which we can make a rational inference of such intent is by com-
paring not only the American and foreign market prices, but also the costs
incurred by the dumper and the American industry. As an illustration, let us
assume, without attempting to exhaust the range of possible situations, a set
of economic circumstances giving rise to the following figures.08
TABLE I
Home
Out- Average Market Dumping Total Total
put Cost Price Price Revenue Cost Profit
A. 100 4 5 500 400 100
B. 200 2 5 3 800 400 400
C. 200 2 5 1.5 650 400 250
Case A depicts the financial status of a foreign producer selling in his home
market. But it may be that by doubling his output he can substantially reduce
his costs, as in case B. In these circumstances he may prefer not to disturb
his home market price but will sell the excess production in the American
market at a lower dumping price. Even at this price his profit is significantly
increased. Obviously this behavior alone does not support a conclusion that
the producer intends to monopolize the American market. Suppose the picture
for all the American firms looks like this:
TABLE II
Ameri-
Out- Average can Dumping Total Total Total
put Cost Price Price Revenue Cost Profit
1,000 2 4 3 4,000 2,000 2,000
In this case the American firms may maintain their price, in which case 10%
of the firms will be displaced, or they may meet the dumping price, reducing
their total profit by 50%o.69 Assuming that shipping costs are nominal within
riers. Were it not for such insulation a third party could buy goods in the dumped country
and resell them in the seller's market, undercutting his higher price in that market.
68. The figures presented here are designed to establish a non-economic point - the
difficulty of concluding anything about a dumper's intent from the mere fact of dumping,
69. The fact that the dumping price is below the American market price is not con.
clusive of intent to monopolize. Even under existing standards a foreigner may sell below
the American price to compensate the natural competitive advantage American firms
possess in being closer to the buyer, Titanium Dioxide, 28 Fed. Reg. 10467 (1963), or to
meet lower priced foreign competition, Steel Wire Rods cases, note 14 supra.
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the domdstic market - that no regional industries exist TO - the dumper can
scarcely be accused of intending to monopolize, unless he is capable of ex-
panding his production indefinitely. And even if this were the case, it would
seem unreasonable to infer an intent to monopolize absent actual expansion
and domination of the American market. Moreover, it will be observed that
even if the dumper began to expand his capacity, the foreseeable effect would
be to force the American price down to the level of the dumping price. This
potential competition, represented by the dumper's ability to expand produc-
tion, results in a saving of 25%o to American consumers of the product. Far
from disparaging such competition, American courts have consistently en-
70. The regional industry concept introduces a complicating factor. In the case of
heavy, bulky goods with high transportation costs a manufacturer may only be able to
compete within a limited geographical area. If the dumper in Case B, Table I, produced
such goods and sold all of his excess production in a regional market in the U.S., he
might completely destroy all domestic production in the area. This would probably amount
to "injury to competition" under the standards developed in the text.
The history of the regional industry concept in dumping discussions is an interesting
one. The idea was first employed in the case of Cast-Iron Soil Pipe from the United
Kingdom, Treas. Dept. Press Release, Oct. 27, 1955, but considerable criticism followed.
For the importer's side of the case see 1957 House Hearings 92-98 (Remarks of A. NV.
Horton). For criticism of the decision see id. at 105, 199; S. REP. No. 1312, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess. 27 (1956) ; Kohnt, The Antidumping Act: Its Administration and Place in Aimer-
can Trade Policy, 60 McH. L. RE V. 407, 418 (1962). The application of the regional indus-
try concept was upheld on appeal. Horton v. Humphrey, 146 F. Supp. 819 (D.D.C. 1956),
aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 921 (1956).
A dumping finding was placed in effect in 1955 on the basis of injury to the cast iron
soil pipe industry in California. In June 1958 an importer sold soil pipe in Philadelphia at
a dumping price.-Despite his argument that he could not possibly sell in the California
market because shipping costs would increase his costs by 1001, the Customs Court
found that the presumption of injury had not been rebutted. Ellis K. Orlowitz Co. v.
United States, 200 F. Supp. 302 (Cust. Ct. 1961). Particularly strained on the existing
facts is the statement by Johnson, J. (concurring), id. at 312, "if a recognized segment of
the domestic cast iron soil pipe industry is being ... injured, there is certainly some injury
to the whole industry, since the whole is the sum of its parts." Since all but one [Bicycles
from Czechoslovakia, 25 Fed. Reg. 9782 (1960)] of the injury findings made since 1954
have involved injury to regional industries this problem is likely to recur and may require
legislative action.
As the situation stands, a finding of injury to one regional market supports the levy
of dumping duty on goods entered in any market. There appears to be no forum in which
the importer can argue that the dumped goods are noninjurious in the second market. In
a telephone interview on April 24, 1964, James P. Hendrick, Deputy Asst. Sec'y of the
Treasury, stated that an importer might apply to the Treasury for a modification of an
existing dumping duty under 19 C.F.R. § 14.12 if he could establish that he mas no longer
selling at less than fair value, but that there is no established procedure for ciallenging
an existing dumping finding on the ground that economic changes have rendered dumping
non-injurious. The Treasury has apparently never faced the problem. Mr. Hendrick sug-
gested that the appropriate solution would be to send the case to the Tariff Commission
requesting it to hold a new inquiry into.the question. There is, however, no authority or
precedent for this procedure.
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couraged it as a means of keeping consumer prices reasonable. 1 Finally, the
fact that the domestic and foreign costs of production are equal suggests that
there is no possibility of the dumper achieving a monopoly position." The
increased competition in the American market should only result in reducing
the price charged by the domestic industry to a more competitive level, and
only the least efficient American firms will find it impossible to remain in
the market.
Perhaps the only circumstances in which a specific intent to monopolize
can be inferred are those in which the dumper sells at a price which is below
his own cost and that of American industry. 3 As Case C, Table I, indicates,
it may be possible for the dumper to realize an incremental profit even though
selling below cost. But there is no rational reason for him to do this when the
American price level is equal to or greater than his cost, unless he intends
first to drive American firms out of the market and then to raise his price
to a monopoly level.74 The dumper may well succeed in this endeavor since
in the future he can reduce his price at will in order to prevent American firms
from re-entering the market to take advantage of the higher price. In this
case the inference of intent may lead to the conclusion that sanctions should
be inVoked.75
The foregoing method of analysis appears to be the only rational method
of determining injury to competition in dumping cases, but unfortunately it
71. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir,
1945); Procter & Gamble Co., F.T.C. Dkt. No. 6901, Nov. 26, 1963, 3 C.C5L T.AnS
RaG. REP. 16,673 (1963), United States v Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
72. Cf. RowE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 29-31.
73. It should be noted, however, that the fact that a dumper sells below his cost will
not always support an inference of predatory intent. If, for example, the American Industry
looked like this:
Average American Dumper's
Output Cost Price Price
1,000 1 1.5 1.5
the dumper in Case C of Table I would merely be meeting the American price and at.
tempting to gain the maximum incremental profit available from his expanded production.
Since his cost is higher than that of American firms he never should be able to establish a
monopoly.
74. This would be the case if the dumper could expand indefinitely or if the American
market were regional. See note 70 .spra.
75. The inference of intent suggested by the data presented should be conclusive in
cases in which the dumper has succeeded in appropriating a substantial share of the
domestic market. Where there is a finding of intent to monopolize but little actual effect,
it may be questionable whether any purpose is served by restricting dumping. If an
incipiency test is thought desirable, the crucial inquiry will concern the potential capacity
and access to capital of the dumper in comparison to the domestic industry. If the dumper's
potential in these areas is more restricted than that of his American competitors, It 1s
unlikely that he will, as a practical matter, be able to become a large enough factor II
the market to substantially impair the competitive process, and his "predatory" program
may be dismissed as an "irrational" effort against which sanctions would be unnecessary.
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raises serious practical problems. In the ordinary situation it will be difficult
to secure the necessary cost data. In the large firm which manufactures a
variety of products, it may be impossible to calculate the production cost of
one item in a manner that is not highly arbitrary. Even if such figures could
be accurately determined, most firms, foreign and domestic, would be reluc-
tant to make them known to the government or to other firms in the industry.70
The analysis undertaken thus far leads to the conclusion that any attempt
to-develop standards which would rationalize the Antidumping Act will meet
with failure. The act was seemingly constructed on the assumption that the
problems of international commerce required special methods of regulation
in order to render the antitrust laws fully effective. But it has been demon-
strated that dumping in and of itself is not inherently injurious in the sense
of restricting competition or tending to create monopoly, and further th.t no
reasonable inference of intent to monopolize can be drawn from the mere
fact of price discrimination. It thus appears that Congress' original emphasis
on dumping was misplaced and that there is no valid reason for singling out
dumping as a condition precedent to the finding of injury necessary for the
imposition of sanctions restricting the flow of imports. In short, the concept
of an antidumping act is unnecessary because the determination that goods
are sold at less than fair value tells us nothing about the anticompetitive nature,
purpose, or effect of import practices.
Since, in the final analysis, there is nothing in the concept of dumping to
merit a special system of governmental scrutiny, there seems to be no reason
why trade in imports should not be relegated to the general standards of the
Sherman Act. Cases in which it appears that imports are endangering compe-
tition in the American market can be dealt with in the same manner as cases
involving wholly domestic commerce. It may be objected that there will be
difficulties in securing jurisdiction over foreign individuals and corporations
for purposes of adjudicating Sherman Act violations. But these problems could
probably be cured more easily and more directly by a special statute appointing
a government official as agent for ser-vice of process on foreign based im-
porters 77 than by the cumbersome administrative machinery of the Antidumping
76. One suggested procedure is to establish a presumption that suspected goods are
being dumped and levy a dumping duty if an importer fails to disclose the necessary
information. S. 1318, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., § 10(f) (1963) (Humphrey Amendment). This
bill also proposed procedures for protecting confidential information, §§ 10(b)-(d). Rep-
resentatives of importing associations have found even these proposals highly objectionable.
Memorandum on S. 1318 for the United States-Japan Trade Council, July 9, 1963 pp. 7-9.
77. Such statutes are not uncommon. See, e.g., 72 Stat. 794 (1958), 49 U.S.C. §
1485(b) (1958) (Foreign air carriers) ; 61 Stat. 648 (1947) 6 U.S.C. § 7 (1958) (foreign
surety companies). State statutes with broader effect often require foreign corporations
to appoint an agent for service of process before the corporation can transact business
in the state. See, e.g., PA. CoNsTuTION art. 16, § 5; P.& STAT. AxN. tit. 15, § 3142 (1958),
upheld in Allentown Record Co. v. Agrashell, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 790, 793-94; (E.D. Pa.
1951). N.Y. GEN. Coan. LAw. § 210; and cf. Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143
U.S. 305, 314-15 (1891). Precedents also exist which indicate that such jurisdiction may
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Act. This expedient would still preserve an important and desirable purpose
of the Antidumping Act - preventing the establishment of foreign based
monopolies in the American market - and at the same time the administration
of this policy would be rendered compatible with the developing national in-
terest in expanded international commerce and consistent with our traditional
domestic commitment to preserve the benefits of competition.
be obtained without a statute, RowE, PaicE DIscUmImNrioN UNDER THE RonuS0 N-PATMAN
Act 77, 81-83 (1964). In 1928-29 the Justice Department obtained two consent decree5
under the Sherman and Clayton Acts against European producers of potash and quinine,
The decrees barred the defendants from discriminating directly or indirectly between
purchasers, dealers, or consumers located in the United States. Id. at 83 & nn.160, 161.
